Abstract: This article offers a linguistic analysis of the conceptual metaphors of Brexit, in which the source and the target belong to the same semiotic mode or to different ones. It is shown that the variation of high-level cognitive models underpinning metaphoric images of Brexit reflects the author's stance towards the event. Phases of Brexit are associated with different image-schematic cognitive models, and this impinges on the range of those metaphors of Brexit that involve low-level concepts.
Introduction
This study looks at monomodal and multimodal instantiations of the conceptual metaphors of Brexit in traditional and new media ecologies. Reflecting upon the dictionary meaning of the term 'Brexit' (the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) (OED, s.a.), a British journalist Matthew Tempest remarks that it is 'both narrow -and vague -enough to satisfy most people ' (Tempest 2017) . Obviously, by 'most people' he means the least critical and / or inquisitive part of the population, whom he believes to be in the majority. In spite of this disputable point, he is undoubtedly right in assuming that a dictionary definition is not capable of capturing all the cultural, political, and economic implications of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. In order to make better sense of Brexit, it is necessary to consider the environment, in which the messages about it are generated and contested. A broad context of the UK and EU relationship is presented in 2.1.
In addition to its social significance, Brexit has turned out to be attractive to linguists.
Thus, Musolff (2017) considers the dynamics of a metaphor that has dominated the UK-EU discourse for over two decades -BRITAIN AT THE HEART OF EUROPE, reaching its culmination point with Brexit.
Since my study focuses on the conceptual metaphors of Brexit, which I treat as dynamic discourse formations, and not stable cognitive representations stored in speakers' minds, I consider it necessary to clarify what kind of cognitive modelling fits this approach best. In 2.2, in the spirit of van Dijk (2008a) , I argue that it is the situational model rather than the cultural model that is capable of capturing the contextually rich nature of the metaphoric images of Brexit.
Situation models have the capacity to construct meaning from what is conveyed by various semiotic means -both by verbal (written or spoken text) and non-verbal (visual images, music, gestures, posture, eye-gaze, facial expression, touch, smell, etc.) .
People interpret signs that belong to different semiotic systems simultaneously, or, in different terms, concurrently process information that comes via different channels, or modes (Forceville 2009: 23-14) . This entails that conceptual metaphors of Brexit can be both monomodal (for instance, verbal or pictorial) and multimodal, i.e. represented in a combination of different modes, in particular, verbal and pictorial (Morozova 2017 ).
In present-day communication and media studies, it is universally accepted that the type of medium affects the way messages are constructed (McLuhan 1994) . This postulate holds true for multimodal metaphors, among other linguistic phenomena.
Metaphors may be 'purely multimodal' only in traditional formats of transmitting information -paper or broadcast. In the new media ecology -the Internet -hypermodal metaphors can also be found.
My sample has two important constraints: firstly, the array contains cognitive metaphors of Brexit that appeared in the mass media in the time span of a year and a half, from June 2016 to October 2017; secondly, multimodal and hypermodal metaphors of Brexit are considered only in static images (a picture, a photo, a cartoon)
found on the Internet. An overview of the up-to-date research into monomodal, multimodal, and hypermodal conceptual metaphors is given in 2.3.
The aims of the article are twofold, though to a certain extent overlapping. The first one is to reconstruct the situation model of Brexit by drawing on the data available in
Internet texts about Brexit and Internet memes on Brexit with a view of establishing the place of the stance component of the meme's author in it. The second one is to consider the structure and functions of the monomodal (verbal, written) and multimodal (verbal-pictorial) conceptual metaphors of Brexit in order to bring to light their stance-constructive potential and politically relevant implications.
It is argued that English speakers endow Brexit with particular traits with the help of verbal and non-verbal (visual, for this research) means as well as their interplay. With the help of monomodal and multimodal conceptual metaphors, a broad spectrum of features is profiled, evaluated positively or negatively, and re-evaluated in order to express a particular stance of the speaker / writer.
I believe the research to be relevant for the development of present-day linguistics since it aims to go beyond Conceptual Metaphor Theory in its classic version (Lakoff & Johnson 1980) to the areas of Multimodal Metaphor (Forceville 2009 ) and Hypermodal
Metaphor as well as into Critical Discourse Studies.
Structurally, the article consists of four parts: (1) the introduction, (2) theoretical prerequisites and methodology, (3) results and discussion, and (4) the conclusion. The introductory part provides working definitions for the key terms ('Brexit', 'situation model', 'multimodality', 'hypermodality', and 'conceptual metaphor'), presents the aim and scope of the research, gives arguments for its relevance, and outlines the structure of the whole paper. Part 2 provides the theoretical background and methodology for the study of the monomodal and multimodal conceptual metaphors of Brexit. Part 3 presents the results of the research and offers a discussion. The conclusion sums up the results and outlines prospects for further research.
Theoretical prerequisites

Brexit in its historical context
The word Brexit appeared in 2012 to denote the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) and the political process associated with it (OED, s.a.). Structurally, Brexit is a portmanteau word coined by compounding two etymons -British and exit, in the style of the term Grexit (from Greek and exit), which appeared earlier in the same year to denote the threatened exit of Greece from the EU. This wordbuilding model has turned out to be quite productive in the times of uncertainty concerning the EU's future: it has brought to life such coinages as Frexit, Italexit, Swexit, Scoxit, etc. (Brexit wins! 2016) .
This linguistic fact alone may serve as an indication of the social significance of Brexit, since only those things that are of importance for people are laid down in language.
This linguistic evidence agrees with the estimation of Brexit by British political scientists who call the withdrawal of the UK from the EU "the most important and consequential piece of public policy since at least the Second World War" (Usherwood 2017 Evaluating the post-Brexit stances of the UK and the EU, analysts predict that the UK will try to find a good balance between sustaining the belief in the EU and giving a clear message that 'out of the EU' is not the same as 'in the EU', while the EU will try to work out a deal, which is less beneficial to the UK than EU-membership but still advantageous to both sides (ibid.).
Overall, Brexit has turned out to be 'a rare game changer' in European and international affairs (Hanhimäki 2016), adding a new problem to the EU, alongside those of migration flows and the atrophy of the Eurozone economy (Whitman 2016: 509) . From the UK perspective, the country has not confronted a more uncertain environment within which to pursue a European strategy since the end of the Second World War (ibid.).
Modelling Brexit: a cultural or a situational model?
Present-day scholars hold the assumption that the process of discourse production, understanding, and recall is affected not by real-world situations per se, but by their abstractions formed in speakers' minds. Consequently, there is a mental mechanism, which filters through infinite lists of features of real-life events and situations in order to sort out those relevant for ongoing communication. The products of its work are called 'mental models' (Johnson-Laird 1983) , which are representations of an event or situation in the discourse participants' minds. Today, these mental representations are more often referred to as cognitive models (Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera Masegosa 2014: 75) .
Currently, the issue of the nature and functions of cognitive models remains very much on the research agenda of linguists of various persuasions. Cognitive linguists, for instance, apply such varieties of cognitive models as propositional models, idealized cognitive models, image schemas, frames, domains, their combinations, and
extensions. An up-to-date detailed discussion of the issue is given by Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera Masegosa (2014).
The cognitive models listed above relate to static mental representations stored in the long-term memory and shared by all speakers of a language. Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera Masegosa (op. cit.) draw a distinction between primary, low-level, and highlevel cognitive models. They maintain that primary cognitive models relate to those concepts that are directly grounded in our sensory experience, as the one verbalized by the contrasting pair up / down (op. cit.: 64). Low-level cognitive models are framelike configurations of elements that belong to our encyclopedic knowledge, like scenarios (e.g., going to a dentist) and object-related concepts (e.g., table, robin) (ibid.).
High-level cognitive models, like action, object, etc., emerge in the process of abstracting features shared by a number of low-level cognitive models (ibid.).
However, as van Dijk rightfully claims, in discourse production speakers or writers will generally start not from a shared cognitive model of an event or situation, but from their personal ones that organize their subjective beliefs about the situation (van Dijk 2008a:162) . Therefore, a distinction between 'cultural cognitive models' and 'situation cognitive models' seems not only lawful but also expedient.
Cultural models are static: they are stored in the long-term memory, organizing shared knowledge of things, events or situations of a certain type. In East-European linguistics, they are known as concepts. Cultural models, or concepts, are rather broad conceptual entities (for recent research into the problem see Davydyuk & Panasenko 2016; Uberman 2016) . Consequently, those engaged in conceptual studies treat concepts as entities that embrace cognitive models of all ranks (primary-, low-, and high-level).
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In contrast to cultural models, situation models are dynamic. They are constructed online in discourse participants' minds, capturing relevant properties of the situation under consideration and organizing them in a systematic way (van Dijk 2008a:163) .
The knowledge structured by a situation model is unique, defined in terms of subjective participant constructs. Situation models are instantiations of cultural models, thus they represent only a certain portion of respective cultural models, but they usually characterize it in more detail, evoking richer associations. Situation models are not 'prefabricated' mental entities stored in memory and ready to be extracted: they are constructed only as a need for them arises. In that, the notion of a situation model is close to the notion of a mental space originally described by Fauconnier as a small conceptual packet constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 40) .
Kövecses' view of the problem of cognitive modelling (Kövecses 2017 ) entails that such conceptual structures as image schemas, domains, frames, and mental spaces can be arranged into a continuous hierarchy. Following Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) , he treats image schemas as directly meaningful preconceptual structures, analogue patterns that have an internal structure that consists of only a few parts, for example, MOTION, CONTAINER, etc. (Kövecses 2017: 211) . He defines a domain after Langacker (1987: 488) as a coherent area of conceptualization relative to which semantic units may be characterized. Domains like JOURNEY, BODY, and BUILDING illustrate the case. Unlike image schemas, domains are propositional structures, not analogue; they are quite abstract, though more information-rich than image schemas. Due to that, Kövecses (2017: 211) places domains immediately below image schemas in his hierarchy of conceptual models. After Fillmore (1982: 111) ,
Kövecses understands the notion of a frame as any system of concepts related in such a way that in order to understand any one of them one has to understand the whole structure into which it fits. It is obvious that such a definition of a frame is close to
Langacker's definition of a domain. Kövecses (2017: 212) holds that frames involve more conceptually specific information than domains, and thus frames and domains differ in the degree of schematicity. In their turn, frames consist of slots (or roles, in Kövecses' terminology) and relations between them. In actual communicative situations, these slots are filled with particular information content that interacts with contextual information, thus resulting in the formation of mental spaces.
The above-considered cognitive models correlate in the way that is schematically presented in Table 1 below. In this connection, I would like to make two remarks. Firstly, image schemas / primary cognitive models can hardly be said to fit into the hierarchy since they are, by definition (Johnson 1987: 19-21; Lakoff 1987: 459-461) , highly schematic preconceptual structures grounded in perceptual interactions of humans with the world around them.
Being preconceptual, image schemas exist beneath human consciousness, prior to the formation of concepts, and consequently, can hardly be said to enter the same hierarchy with them. For the second point, I side with Zhabotynska (2010: 81) in her claim that frames are most abstract propositional schemas to be filled in with conceptual content, and not the content itself. Thus, frames are not 'ontologically parallel' to domains and concepts. It implies that in Kövecses' hierarchy it would have been more logical to use some other term to denote conceptual entities that correspond to low-level cognitive models (for example, 'concept'), and not the term 'frame' that represents the way such conceptual entities are organized. Yet, unlike the first consideration, this issue is of a terminological nature, and thus it does not influence the basic principles of the hierarchy considered above.
In the analysis to follow, I will proceed from the following hierarchy of cognitive models (Table 2) : (Landale 2017 ). This citation is just one amongst many of the same kind because for over a year now journalists and bloggers (Connolly 2017; Thrower 2017; Usherwood 2017, etc.) have been commenting upon the abundance of metaphors in the speech of those discussing Brexit -politicians, economists, scholars, and ordinary people. The diverse set of metaphors of Brexit is necessary in order to do justice to the complexity of this political phenomenon. In politics, as Brugman (2017) justly remarks, metaphors work by connecting political concepts to non-political concepts, and here I can add only that to a cognitive linguist it hardly comes as a surprise.
Cognitive linguists adopt it as a postulate that metaphors are helpful when discussing things, which are new and / or complicated since they allow speakers / writers to bring to light certain aspects of such entities by likening them to more common / less complicated ones (Lakoff & Johnson 1980 In order to do this, it is necessary to stipulate the theoretical perspective, from which this issue is tackled here.
The present study draws on the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), the foundations of which were laid in the pioneering work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and developed in the scholarship to follow (Gibbs 2011; Grady 1999; Johnson 1987; Kövecses 2002; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Lakoff & Turner 1989, etc.) . Researchers take as the basic CMT premise that the essence of conceptual metaphor lies in understanding one domain of experience (the target) in terms of another experiential domain (the source). Thus, conceptual metaphor is both the process and its end result.
Conceptual structures of the source domain are mapped onto conceptual structures of the target domain, bringing with them a range of entailed attributes.
Although Lakoff and Johnson (1980) admit that the occurrence of metaphor is not confined to language alone, most researchers have considered mainly verbal metaphors. Nonetheless, if metaphors are 'primarily a matter of thought and action'
(op. cit.: 5), then it is reasonable to assume that they are manifest not only in language but also in other semiotic systems (modes). However, for over two decades, little Carroll (1994) and Forceville (1994; 1996; The Internet memes subject to analysis comprise those that include some text (Fig. 1) or are connected to it by a hyper-link (Fig. 2) . I proceed from the assumption that the concept BREXIT can be profiled against different domains, which gives rise to different ways of construing the mental space of Brexit, or its situation model. The latter can incorporate the 'inside' perspective (a UK citizen / organization, who / which supports the 'leave' or 'remain' campaign, is in favour of 'soft' or 'hard ' Brexit, etc.) This means that in different contexts, the semantics of the word Brexit can be made up of elements belonging to different conceptual domains, and the word itself, consequently, will carry positive or negative connotations depending on the type of the construal.
Data and methodology
As all event-structure concepts, BREXIT can be rendered metaphorically in terms of more 'specialized' notions (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 171 These concepts (HUMAN, MOTION, STATE, and CONTAINER) are 'fundamentally human concepts' that 'arise from human biology' (ibid.), and thus they belong to primary cognitive models.
This skeletal conceptual event-structure can be fleshed out inferentially, by primary metaphors (Grady 1999) (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 176) , etc. These metaphors use an image-schema as a source, yet metaphors of other types can also be used to enrich this basic structure, thus forming low-level cognitive models.
In my analysis, drawing a distinction between monomodal (verbal / written mode) and multimodal (verbal / written -pictorial / static) metaphors, I focus, firstly, on the status of the conceptual models (primary, high or low) involved in the process of metaphoric meaning construal, and secondly, on the 'life cycle' of a metaphor, namely, its belonging to a particular phase of the Brexit scenario.
Results and discussion
Verbal metaphors of Brexit
As has been previously shown, the meaning of the term 'Brexit' is based on a metaphor, where the UK ('Britain') is likened to a person, who has taken a decision to leave the place where he / she used to belong (the EU). This personification scheme has been boxing is 'dreadfully old-fashioned' since it ignores the obvious fact that the EU nations are vital trading partners, not participants in a zero-sum game.
The idea of contestation as opposed to cooperation is also present in comparing Brexit to a GAME OF CARDS. Newspapers report that Theresa May tends to 'keep her cards close' (Usherwood 2017) , which implies that the EU is an opponent to the UK, an enemy to be defeated, from whom information should be withheld. Brexit implies that the parties will maintain as close a relationship as possible (Brugman 2017) .
Summing up my observations on the verbal metaphors of Brexit, I should point out that in their majority they are structural ones. They tend to involve complex reasoning, and several correspondences are simultaneously at work in the process of their discourse extension. This accounts for the considerable manipulative potential of such metaphors since different speakers can highlight different mappings entailed by them.
Multimodal metaphors of Brexit
Some of the verbal metaphors mentioned above have found their visual parallels, for instance, Sir Amyas Morse, the current comptroller of the UK's public spending, has compared Brexit to 'a chocolate orange' that might fall apart at the first tap (Landale 2017 ). Images of the chocolate orange followed suit on the Internet. This metaphor is hypermodal because for a person who sees the image depicting the source, but lacks the relevant contextual knowledge it might be quite challenging to reconstruct the target concept without following the hyperlink by clicking on the image. never leave'. In a similar way, the comparison of Brexit to a strawberry pudding, which was given by a culinary blogger Miriam Gonzalez Durantez (international lawyer and wife of Nick Clegg), would be hard to depict due to the unusual elaboration of this metaphor: "The crumble, just like Brexit, seems fine on the outside, though if you look attentively, you can see that there is a mess bubbling up inside. And it will definitely fall apart when you serve it, no matter how hard you try" (Landale 2017 The multimodal metaphtonymy of Brexit in Figure 5 is also based on 'ideological symbols' (Zheltukhina et. al. 2017: 12007) and personification, yet it lacks the easygoing manner of the previous image: there is an empty spot in the circle of remaining stars, which is no longer complete. Thus, two seemingly very similar multimodal metaphtonimies demonstrate varying stances on the issue of Brexit. 
Conclusion
The results of this study show that metaphoric representations of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union may be underpinned by different high-level cognitive models. Their variation reflects the author's stance towards the event:
proponents of Brexit tend to conceptualize it as an ACTION of an ACTOR (the UK) who causes a dynamic controlled state of affairs to hold, while its opponents tend to present it as an uncontrolled PROCESS or a CHANGE OF STATE.
The phases of Brexit are associated with different image-schematic cognitive models: The monomodal verbal metaphors of Brexit (the written mode) tend to be used strategically in order to impose a particular ideological position upon the addressee by appealing to his rational sphere. Multimodal metaphors / metaphtonymies appeal mostly to the emotional sphere. Monomodal verbal metaphors tend to show a greater capacity for extension, thus helping the author to achieve his / her political ends, while multimodal visual-verbal metaphors have a propensity to elicit more intense and diverse emotions from the addressee, serving more to entertain than to persuade to take a particular political position.
Combining the affordances of multimodality and hypermodality, the creator of a metaphor enters into a dialogue with Internet users, thus resisting the monologism of traditional media genres, providing the addressee with an access to discourse diversity, and multiplying the potential of conceptual metaphors deployed in different modes.
Research into monomodal and multimodal metaphors in their contrast and complementarity opens vast projects for exploring different spheres of human life, in particular, the political one. Keywords: Brexit, cognitive model, conceptual metaphor, Internet, monomodality, multimodality. 
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